In Practical Shape, I give an account of practical reasoning whose main purpose is simply to convince people that there is, or at least can be, such a thing. Practical reasoning is reasoning whose conclusion is an action. Theoretical reasoning is reasoning whose conclusion is a belief. It has been standard for people to accept that no action can be the conclusion of reasoning, so that theoretical reasoning is the only reasoning there is. I try to show that an action can stand in just the same relation or relations to the reasoning that leads to it as a belief can stand in to the reasoning that leads to it. In previous work, I defended two views, the combination of which revealed to me the possibility of the position I defend about practical reasoning. In this sense, I got three for the price of two. The first of these views is really just a list of the various ways in which considerations can be practically relevant. A consideration (by which I mean here a matter of fact, an aspect of the situation that confronts me) can be a reason to act in a certain way – can count in favour of so acting; that I need to make this sentence as clear as possible is a reason for me to reflect carefully before I write. And a consideration, whether itself a reason or not, can also enable some other consideration to be a reason when it would not otherwise be, or disable a consideration from being the reason it would otherwise be. And a consideration, whether itself a reason or not, can intensify the reason given us by some other consideration, or attenuate that reason. These distinctions between different forms of relevance are now familiar, and they are important; and maybe there are more such to be recognized, so that the enquiry is ongoing. The second view is the claim I made in Practical Reality that propositions are not reasons for anything; among other things, they are not the reasons for which we act. The truth of a proposition can be a reason to do one thing rather than another, but that truth cannot be another proposition. Only states of affairs are reasons, and a state of affairs is something that is so, something that is the case rather than something that is true. The reasons for which we act are not always reasons so to act, because one can act in the light of a consideration which is (sadly) not the case, or in the light of considerations which are the case but are (sadly, again) not the reasons we take them to be. With these two views in hand, it seemed to me that practical reasoning could consist simply in adducing relevant considerations and responding in whatever way is most favoured by those considerations, taken together. The only difference between acting in

中文翻译：

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实用形状原则

在《实践形态》中，我对实践推理进行了说明，其主要目的只是为了说服人们存在或至少可以存在这种事物。实践推理是推理，其结论是一个行动。理论推理是其结论是信念的推理。人们接受的标准是，任何行动都不能成为推理的结论，因此理论推理是唯一的推理。我试图证明，行动可以与导致其的推理处于相同的关系或关系，就像一种信念可以与导致其的推理一样。在先前的工作中，我为两种观点辩护，这两种观点的结合向我揭示了我为实践推理辩护的可能性。从这个意义上讲，我以两个的价格获得了三个。这些观点中的第一个实际上只是考虑因素在实际中相关的各种方式的列表。考虑（在这里我实际上是指面对我的处境的一个方面）可能是采取某种方式采取行动的理由–可以考虑采取这种行动；我需要使这句话尽可能清楚，这是我在写作之前要认真思考的原因。并且，考虑本身是否是一个原因，也可以使其他考虑成为其他情况下不会成为的原因，或者使某个考虑成为其他情况下不会成为的原因。考虑本身是否是一个原因，可以通过某种其他考虑加深我们给出的原因，或者减弱该原因。现在人们已经熟悉了不同相关形式之间的区别，它们很重要；也许还有更多这样的事情要被认可，以便进行调查。第二种观点是我在实践现实中提出的主张是，命题不是做任何事情的理由。除其他外，它们不是我们采取行动的原因。一个命题的真实性可能是做一件事而不是做另一件事的原因，但是那个事实不能是另一个命题。只有事态是原因，事态是事实，是事实，而不是真实。我们采取行动的原因并不总是采取行动的理由，因为一个人可以根据（不幸地）不是这样的考虑而行动，或者可以根据（但又是）一个实际情况而考虑。而不是我们接受它们的原因。有了这两种观点，在我看来，实践推理可以仅在于提出相关考虑因素，并以这些考虑因素最喜欢的任何方式做出反应。演戏之间的唯一区别