While the concept event has been an important tool in our thinking about causation and action, the concept process has not been appealed to so readily. However, recently, several philosophers have argued that the distinction between events and processes is of much greater metaphysical significance than previously thought. Many of these philosophers have suggested that recognising process as a distinctive ontological category is important for understanding action and agency. One theory of processes which has become popular is a theory I call the “temporal stuff view” of processes. According to the temporal stuff view, processes are the “temporal stuffs” from which events are composed. I propose an alternative to the temporal stuff view. On my theory, processes are a special kind of universal. I suggest that engaging in a process is analogous to instantiating a property, and that events are instances of processes. On this proposal, a substance’s engagement in a process is a special sort of state of affairs (a dynamic state of affairs). I argue that this alternative theory of processes does better than the temporal stuff view when it comes to helping us understand action and agency.

中文翻译：

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流程和行动哲学

尽管概念事件一直是我们思考因果关系和行动的重要工具，但概念过程尚未如此吸引人。但是，最近，一些哲学家认为事件和过程之间的区别比以前的想象具有更大的形而上学意义。这些哲学家中的许多人认为，将过程识别为独特的本体论类别对于理解行为和代理很重要。一种流行的过程理论是一种我称为过程的“时间填充视图”的理论。根据时间填充物的观点，过程是构成事件的“时间填充物”。我提出了一种替代临时材料视图的方法。根据我的理论，过程是一种特殊的普遍性。我建议参与流程类似于实例化属性，事件是流程的实例。根据该提议，物质在过程中的参与是一种特殊的事务状态（动态事务状态）。我认为，在帮助我们理解行动和代理方面，这种替代性的过程理论比临时事物观点更好。