In the last twenty years, constitutivism has become a major contender in the field of metaethics and in the debate about practical rationality. But while it has attracted a lot of attention, the relations between the different versions of constitutivism are still comparatively underexplored. This special issue aims to highlight their differences and similarities by staging a debate between the varieties of constitutivism. The recent rise of constitutivism is mainly due to its promising a way out of an apparent dilemma that is widely thought to have beset twentieth century meta-ethics and the theory of practical rationality in the analytic tradition. This debate has – put in slightly simplified terms – been widely perceived as a stand-off between, on the one hand, different forms of subjectivism and non-cognitivism, and, on the other hand, different forms of realism or objectivism that posited moral norms in a special realm independent of us (as human beings or rational agents). The difficulties these two approaches face are familiar. Theories of the first kind seem incapable of accounting for the necessity of, e.g. moral norms; theories of the latter kind face the difficulty of explaining the action-guiding character of practical norms. Constitutivism claims to avoid both pitfalls. According to it, practical norms are the objects of genuine cognition, but not independent of our agency, since they are internal to what we are as agents of a certain kind or to activities we engage in as such agents. If it could be shown that there are norms which set constitutive standards for engaging in a certain kind of activity (e.g. practical deliberation) or for being a certain kind of object (e.g. a rational agent), constitutivists have thought, this would provide us with an account of normativity and rational obligation which would avoid both the Skylla of subjectivism and the Charybdis of classical objectivism. For such standards would turn out to be binding for all of us if they could be shown to be internal to what we are essentially or to an activity that is fundamental to our way of being. There are multiple ways in which this general idea has been spelled out in the literature. Recently, the label “constitutivism” has sometimes been used in a broad sense so as to include approaches traditionally thought to be skeptical of the very idea of inescapable and necessary moral norms (e.g. Hume and Nietzsche). However, the more common usage of the term puts the focus on branches of constitutivism that explicitly purport to capture the unconditional necessity of moral or ethical norms. On the one hand, a neoKantian version according to which the concept that characterizes what we are essentially is the concept of a rational or autonomous agent. In consequence, the fundamental practical

中文翻译：

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各种本构主义

在过去的二十年中，构成主义已经成为元伦理学领域和有关实践理性的辩论的主要竞争者。但是，尽管它引起了很多关注，但相对而言，不同版本的宪政主义之间的关系仍未得到充分开发。本期特刊旨在通过辩论各种构成主义来突出它们的异同。宪政主义的近来兴起主要是由于它有希望摆脱一种明显的困境，而这种困境被普遍认为困扰着20世纪的元伦理学和分析传统中的实践理性理论。这场辩论（用稍微简化的术语表示）被广泛认为是一方面主观主义和非认知主义的不同形式之间的对峙，另一方面，将道德规范设定在独立于我们（作为人类或理性主体）的特殊领域中的不同形式的现实主义或客观主义。这两种方法面临的困难是熟悉的。第一类理论似乎无法解释道德规范的必要性。后者的理论面临着解释实践规范的行为指导特征的困难。宪法主义主张避免两种陷阱。根据它，实践规范是真正认知的对象，但并不独立于我们的代理机构，因为它们是我们作为某种类型的代理人或作为代理人从事的活动的内部。如果可以证明存在为从事某种活动设定构成标准的规范（例如，建构主义者认为，这是一种现实的商议）或作为某种客体（例如，理性的代理人），这将为我们提供规范性和理性义务的说明，这既避免了主观主义的“天a”，又避免了古典客观主义的“夏里亚德”。对于这样的标准，如果可以证明它们对我们本质或对我们生存方式至关重要的活动是内在的，那么对我们所有人来说都是具有约束力的。在文献中阐明了这种总体思想的方式有很多种。最近，“构成主义”这个标签有时被广泛地使用，以便包括传统上被认为对不可避免的和必要的道德规范（例如休ume和尼采）这一观念持怀疑态度的方法。然而，该术语的更常用用法将焦点放在构成主义的分支上，这些分支明确地旨在抓住道德或伦理规范的无条件必要性。一方面，是一种新康德式的版本，根据该版本，刻画我们本质的概念是理性或自治主体的概念。因此，基本实用