In this paper, I offer a third way in debates over the scope of phenomenal consciousness, in the form of a novel synthesis of liberal and conservative introspective observations. My primary claim is that at least some liberal observations arise due to the existence of a heretofore unrecognized type of phenomenal concepts, liberal phenomenal concepts, while conservative observations arise by virtue of the nonexistence of at least some types of liberal phenomenal contents. Liberal phenomenal concepts, when deployed in direct introspection on phenomenal consciousness, misrepresent consciousness as including high-level, liberal contents. The misattribution of these contents to consciousness is partly defeasible, however: by using a more methodical, stringent heuristic for cataloging the introspected contents of consciousness, it is possible to note the nonexistence of liberal phenomenal contents. Thus, at least in some cases, conservatives are right and liberals are wrong about the scope of phenomenal consciousness. However, liberals have picked up on something conservatives have missed: an inaccurate introspective appearance caused by liberal phenomenal concepts. The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin by defending the faithfulness to introspection of liberal and conservative observations in the context of the debate over the existence of cognitive phenomenology. I then show how liberal phenomenal concepts can explain these observations, and discuss three jointly sufficient conditions whose collective truth serves to establish that a type of liberal content is misattributed to phenomenal consciousness by such concepts. Before concluding, I briefly consider an explanation for why liberal phenomenal concepts might exist.

中文翻译：

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自由现象观

在本文中，我以新颖的自由主义和保守主义内省性观察的综合形式，提供了关于现象意识范围的辩论的第三种方式。我的主要主张是，至少存在一些自由主义的观察是由于存在迄今无法识别的现象概念，即自由现象概念，而保守的观察是由于至少某些类型的自由现象内容不存在而产生的。自由现象概念在直接反省现象意识时，会误以为意识包括高层的自由内容。这些内容对意识的错误归因在某种程度上是不可行的：但是，通过使用更有条理，更严格的启发式方法对自省的意识内容进行分类，有可能注意到自由现象内容的不存在。因此，至少在某些情况下，保守主义者是对的，而自由主义者则对现象意识的范围是错误的。但是，自由主义者采取了一些保守主义者所错过的东西：由自由主义现象概念引起的不正确的内省表象。本文的结构如下。首先，在关于认知现象学存在的辩论的背景下，捍卫对自由主义和保守主义观察的反思的忠诚。然后，我将展示自由现象概念如何解释这些观察结果，并讨论三个共同的充分条件，这些条件的集体真实性有助于确定这种观念将一种自由内容误认为是现象意识。在结束之前，