Properly understood, Kant’s moral philosophy is incompatible with constitutivism. According to the constitutivist, being subject to the moral law cannot be a matter of free choice, and failure to comply with it is to be understood as a deficiency in one’s integrity as an intentional agent. I reconstruct Kant’s arguments to the conclusion that immorality, moral evil, consists in choosing to give one’s unity as an intentional agent supremacy over the moral law, and that one’s being subject to the moral law must be one’s own free choice. And I explain how Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, according to which we cannot be subject to the moral law without actually being morally evil, protects this conclusion from entailing the denial of the unconditionally binding character of moral principles, which character constitutivists correctly identify as the central concern of Kant’s – or any – moral philosophy.

中文翻译：

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自治与激进邪恶：康德主义对宪政的挑战

正确理解，康德的道德哲学与宪政主义格格不入。这位宪政主义者认为，服从道德法不能是自由选择的问题，不遵守道德法应被理解为一个人作为故意代理人的完整性不足。我重新构造了康德的论点，得出这样的结论，即不道德即道德邪恶，在于选择作为统一对道德法的至高无上的故意代理人，而服从道德法则必须是自己的自由选择。并且我解释了康德的根本罪学说是如何保护我们的这一结论免于否定否认道德原则的无条件约束性质的，根据该学说，如果我们实际上不属于道德上的罪恶，就不能服从道德法则，