Archaeologists tend to be pessimists, and also critical by default in respect to how much they can say about the past in a meaningful manner. In principle we agree that we can say some things, but when confronted with specific questions we tend to embrace an ‘epistemic anxiety’ (Wylie and Chapman 2016). This point has been nicely illustrated by Harry Fokkens’s survey at the recent ‘Grave Matters’ conference (June 2018): when the audience were asked to make claims about a shown Prehistoric grave – for example, ‘Is this an archer? Is this man poorer than the one shown before?’ – 70% answered that we can’t possibly say those things. Caution is welcome in science, but it can also become a problem if we tend to focus only on what can be said for certain, avoiding explanations and speculations. This attitude is what philosopher of science Adrian Currie calls in the present volume ‘hiding the heads in the sands of naïve empiricism’ (p. 290), a restrictive methodological and epistemic approach. And this isn’t always the most interesting thing to do. Currie rightly claims that historical scientists in general – and here he includes geologists, palaeontologists and archaeologists – have plenty of reasons to be more optimistic about their epistemic success. Especially when the record we are dealing with is heterogenous and fragmentary, we should be ‘wild, messy, and creative’ (p. 290), as this is what will eventually lead us to a richer and more robust image of the past. That is because we have several strategies to mitigate against ‘unlucky’ circumstances: we are methodologically omnivores; we can also use non-trace evidence – analogies, models and simulations; we can improve our middle-range theories (historical investigation being scaffolded); and take a pragmatic stance towards hypothesismaking. He then unpacks these strategies throughout the 13 chapters. The wider intellectual context of this endeavour is a recent body of work in philosophy of science which try to advance strategies for addressing the epistemic challenges posed by archaeological data, such as Alison Wylie’s inquiries into legacy data, and evidential claims (e.g. 2011, 2017), or Rune Nyrup’s interests in analogy and speculation. In what follows I will briefly summarise the main points of the book, and focus on those relevant to archaeology. Given that some of the philosophical themes discussed, as well as the non-archaeology examples, are both beyond my expertise and interest, I choose to discuss what I find of relevance to archaeology. The book is interesting in this respect, as at a superficial glance it might appear that archaeology is of marginal interest to the author: archaeological case studies only make cameo appearances in chapters 1, 4 (pp. 106–109), 6 (pp. 161–165) and 7 (pp. 186–191). The language of the book also betrays that it has been written for philosophers of science as part of ongoing discussions on knowledge-production, explanation, confirmation, etc. Even so, through its arguments and themes I think this volume is extremely pertinent to archaeology as it gives us props that can help us navigate our epistemic anxieties. Chapter 1 sets the tone by looking at the range of information one can reconstruct from one single platypus tooth, thus challenging the idea that ‘ambiguous, degraded signals from the past’ (p. 5) make us helpless in the face of such ‘unlucky’ circumstances. HereAdrianCurrie introduces what he identifies as the commonly assumed grounds for pessimism: ‘(1) our available evidence about the past is limited to traces; (2) much information from the past has degraded or disappeared; (3) historical scientists cannot manufacture evidence’ (p. 8). However, the author quite importantly concludes that these grounds are based on a mistaken

中文翻译：

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岩石、骨头和废墟：乐观主义者的历史科学指南

考古学家往往是悲观主义者，并且在默认情况下，他们对他们可以以有意义的方式谈论过去的程度持批评态度。原则上我们同意我们可以说一些事情，但是当面对具体问题时，我们倾向于接受“认知焦虑”（Wylie and Chapman 2016）。Harry Fokkens 在最近的“Grave Matters”会议（2018 年 6 月）上的调查很好地说明了这一点：当观众被要求对展示的史前坟墓做出声明时——例如，“这是一个弓箭手吗？这个人比之前显示的更穷吗？– 70% 的人回答说我们不可能说那些话。谨慎在科学中是受欢迎的，但如果我们倾向于只关注可以肯定地说的话，避免解释和推测，它也会成为一个问题。这种态度就是科学哲学家阿德里安·柯里 (Adrian Currie) 在本卷中所说的“将头脑隐藏在朴素经验主义的沙子中”（第 290 页），这是一种限制性的方法论和认识论方法。这并不总是最有趣的事情。Currie 正确地声称，一般的历史科学家——在这里他包括地质学家、古生物学家和考古学家——有很多理由对他们的认知成功更加乐观。尤其是当我们处理的唱片是异质的和零散的时，我们应该“狂野、凌乱和有创意”（第 290 页），因为这最终会让我们对过去有一个更丰富、更强大的形象。那是因为我们有几种策略来减轻“不幸”的情况：我们在方法论上是杂食动物；我们也可以使用无痕证据——类比，模型和模拟；我们可以改进我们的中程理论（历史调查被搭建起来）；并对假设制定采取务实的立场。然后，他在 13 章中解开了这些策略。这项努力的更广泛的知识背景是科学哲学领域的最新工作，这些工作试图推进解决考古数据带来的认知挑战的策略，例如艾莉森·威利对遗留数据和证据主张的调查（例如 2011、2017） ，或者 Rune Nyrup 对类比和推测的兴趣。在下文中，我将简要总结本书的要点，并重点介绍与考古学相关的内容。鉴于讨论的一些哲学主题以及非考古学的例子都超出了我的专业知识和兴趣，我选择讨论我发现的与考古学相关的内容。这本书在这方面很有趣，因为从表面上看，作者似乎对考古学没有兴趣：考古案例研究仅在第 1、4（第 106-109 页）、第 6（第 106-109 页）章节中出现。 161–165）和 7（第 186–191 页）。这本书的语言也表明它是为科学哲学家写的，作为关于知识生产、解释、确认等正在进行的讨论的一部分。即便如此，通过它的论点和主题，我认为这本书与考古学非常相关，因为它为我们提供了可以帮助我们应对认知焦虑的道具。第 1 章通过查看可以从一颗鸭嘴兽牙齿中重建的信息范围来定下基调，从而挑战了“模棱两可，来自过去的退化信号”（第 5 页）使我们在面对这种“不幸”的情况时无能为力。在这里，阿德里安柯里介绍了他认为普遍假设的悲观主义理由：“（1）我们关于过去的可用证据仅限于痕迹；(2) 过去的许多信息已经退化或消失；(3) 历史科学家不能制造证据”（第 8 页）。然而，作者非常重要地得出结论，这些理由是基于错误的