ABSTRACT Friedman’s perspective on scientific change is a sophisticated attempt to combine Kantian transcendental philosophy and the Kuhnian historiographical model. In this article, I will argue that Friedman’s account, despite its virtues, fails to achieve the philosophical goals that it self-consciously sets, namely to unproblematically combine the revolutionary perspective of scientific development and the neo-Kantian philosophical framework. As I attempt to show, the impossibility of putting together these two aspects stems from the incompatibility between (a) Friedman’s neo-Kantian conception of the role of philosophy and the role of the notion of incommensurability, and (b) the framework of transcendental idealism and the radical character of scientific revolutions. Hence, I suggest that pace Friedman and pace Kuhn’s own self-understanding, the Kuhnian theory of scientific revolutions cannot be seen as ‘Kantianism with moveable categories’ and consequently we should either abandon the notion of radical scientific revolution or place the Kuhnian account into another, non-Kantian philosophical framework.

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库恩主义和新康德主义：弗里德曼对科学变革的描述

摘要弗里德曼对科学变革的观点是将康德先验哲学与库恩历史学模型相结合的一次复杂尝试。在本文中，我将争辩说，弗里德曼的论述尽管有其优点，但却无法实现它自觉设定的哲学目标，即毫无问题地将科学发展的革命性观点与新康德哲学框架相结合。正如我试图证明的那样，不可能将这两个方面放在一起是由于（a）弗里德曼（Friedman）的新康德哲学角色概念与不可通约性概念的角色之间的不兼容，以及（b）先验理想主义的框架以及科学革命的根本特征。因此，我建议步伐弗里德曼和步伐库恩自己的理解，