ABSTRACT Peter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I will argue that it has both the uses they discussed—it can be used for making claims about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are, and it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experiments. Furthermore, it can be useful in explanations. More generally, I will argue that more coarse-grained concepts (like confirmation) can be useful, even when we have more fine-grained concepts (like credences).

中文翻译：

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贝叶斯确认有什么用？

摘要PeterBrössel和Franz Huber在2015年提出，贝叶斯确认概念毫无用处。我将争辩说，它既具有讨论的用途，又可以用于宣称各种假设的可信度，并且可以用于度量实验的认知价值。此外，它在解释中可能很有用。更笼统地说，我认为更粗粒度的概念（如确认）可能是有用的，即使我们有更多细粒度的概念（如证书）。