ABSTRACT Philosophers such as Goodman (1954), Scheffler (1963) and Glymour (1983) aim to answer the Paradox of the Ravens by distinguishing between confirmation simpliciter and selective confirmation. The latter evidential relation occurs when data not only confirms a hypothesis, but also disconfirms one of its ‘rival’ hypotheses. The appearance of paradox is allegedly due to a conflation of valid intuitions about selective confirmation with our intuitions about confirmation simpliciter. Theories of evidence, like the standard Bayesian analysis, should only be understood as explications of confirmation simpliciter; when we disambiguate between selective confirmation and confirmation simpliciter, there is no longer a paradox from these theories. Bandyopadhyay and Brittan (2006) have revived this answer within a sophisticated Bayesian analysis of confirmation and severe testing. I argue that, despite the attractive features of the Selective Confirmation Answer, there is no analysis of this evidential relation that satisfactorily answers the Paradox of the Ravens, and the prospects for any answer along these lines are bleak. We must look elsewhere.

中文翻译：

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乌鸦悖论的选择性确认答案

摘要哲学家，例如古德曼（Goodman）（1954），舍弗勒（Scheffler）（1963）和格利莫（Glymour）（1983），旨在通过区分确认简化符和选择性确认来回答乌鸦悖论。当数据不仅确认假设，而且还否认其“相对”假设之一时，就会发生后一种证据关系。据称，悖论的出现是由于将关于选择性确认的有效直觉与我们关于确认简化子的直觉混合在一起的。证据理论，如标准贝叶斯分析，应仅被理解为确认简化语的解释。当我们在选择性确认和确认简化语之间消除歧义时，这些理论不再存在悖论。Bandyopadhyay和Brittan（2006）在对确认和严格测试的复杂贝叶斯分析中重新获得了这个答案。我认为，尽管“选择性确认答案”具有吸引人的特征，但没有对这种证据关系的分析能够令人满意地回答“乌鸦悖论”的问题，而按照这些思路做出任何答案的前景都是黯淡的。我们必须寻找其他地方。