ABSTRACT The idea that there might be multiple universes with different parameters of nature is often considered an attractive response to the finding that various parameters appear to be delicately fine-tuned for life. The present paper investigates whether the appeal to fine-tuning can legitimately be combined with an appeal to independent empirical evidence for other universes or whether, as suggested by Cory Juhl, combining such appeals inevitably results in illegitimate double counting of the finding that the parameters are right for life. In doing so, the paper takes into account the fact that the parameters' life-friendliness is old evidence for us, which makes Bayesianism's problem of old evidence relevant to Bayesian analysis of its evidential impact. Ultimately, the verdict reached is that the warning of double counting is helpful, but that double counting can in principle be avoided. The paper highlights remaining independent challenges against the fine-tuning argument for the multiverse.

中文翻译：

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作为旧证据，重复计数和多元宇宙进行微调

摘要可能存在多个具有不同自然参数的宇宙的想法通常被认为是对发现各种参数似乎对生命进行微调的一个有吸引力的回应。本文研究了是否可以将微调的诉求与对其他宇宙的独立经验证据的诉求合法地结合起来，或者如Cory Juhl所建议的那样，将这些诉求相结合是否不可避免地导致对参数为一生的权利。在此过程中，本文考虑了参数的生命周期对我们而言是旧证据这一事实，这使得贝叶斯主义的旧证据问题与贝叶斯对其证据影响的分析相关。最终，得出的结论是重复计数的警告会有所帮助，但原则上可以避免重复计数。本文强调了针对多元宇宙的微调论点仍然存在的独立挑战。