ABSTRACT In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.

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对于科学史学家有什么意义？关于科学哲学对科学史的价值的思考

摘要在本文中，我将探讨科学哲学对科学史的价值。首先，我将介绍区分历史和科学哲学的两种方式之间的区别：科学历史哲学（HPS）和科学哲学历史（PHS）。然后，我对艾姆雷·拉卡托斯（Imre Lakatos）的项目进行批判性讨论，该项目将科学哲学带入历史解释。我指出了Lakatos项目中的某些缺陷，我认为这表明过去PHS出了什么问题。最后，我提出了自己的尝试，以发掘科学哲学的史学潜力。从诺伍德·罗素·汉森（Norwood Russell Hanson）的见识开始，即科学的历史研究涉及超科学概念，我认为对这些概念的哲学思考可以是（实际上，在历史上一直是富有成果的。我主要关注四个问题（流行性价值观，实验，科学发现和概念变化），并讨论它们在史学实践中的意义和实用性。