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A punishment mechanism in the spatial public goods game with continuous strategies
EPL ( IF 1.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-09 , DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/132/10007
Han-Xin Yang 1 , Ming-Jian Fu 2, 3
Affiliation  

We propose a punishment mechanism in the spatial public goods game with continuous strategies. The value of strategy denotes the amount that an individual contributes to each group. In a group, the ones who contribute the least will be punished by others and punishers equally share the associated costs. It is found that the punishment fine and the number of individuals being punished in a group play important roles in the evolution of cooperation. Compared with the case of no punishment, the cooperation level increases (decreases) when the number of individuals being punished is less (more) than half of the total number of individuals in a group. For a fixed value of the enhancement factor, the cooperation level increases (decreases) as the punishment fine increases when individuals being punished are the minority (majority) in a group.



中文翻译:

具有连续策略的空间公益博弈中的惩罚机制

我们提出了具有连续策略的空间公共产品博弈中的惩罚机制。策略的值表示个人为每个组贡献的数量。在一个小组中,贡献最少的人将受到他人的惩罚,惩罚者平均分担相关费用。研究发现,罚款罚款和集体处罚的人数在合作的发展中起着重要的作用。与没有惩罚的情况相比,当被惩罚的人数少于(多于)一个组总数的一半时,合作水平会提高(降低)。对于增强因子的固定值,当被处罚的个人是一个群体中的少数(多数)时,合作水平随着处罚罚款的增加而增加(减少)。

更新日期:2021-02-09
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