This paper examines the historical developments and the debates revolving around the formation of an Ottoman–Iranian alliance in the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the 1908 Revolution. It argues that although neither the idea of an alliance between the two states nor the attempt to establish it was new, the way it was discussed, justified, and promoted in this period was different. The previous attempts by the Ottomans were led by the state as part of a broader pan-Islamist project (ittihad-ı İslam) that adopted a heavily religious tone. On the other hand, the main proponents of the alliance during the constitutional period were mostly transnational/international figures and religious scholars, who framed the issue within the context of Ottoman–Iranian relations, focusing on immediate pragmatic, strategic, and ideological concerns, such as protecting the sovereignty and security of the two countries against European imperialism through constitutionalism. Rather than focusing on reconciling the disputes between the Sunnis and Shi’is, and presenting this alliance as the first step towards the formation of a broader Islamic union as Abdülhamid II did in the nineteenth century, these people emphasized brotherhood and solidarity between the two constitutional governments, and tried to establish a strategic partnership based on shared borders, experiences, ideals, and enemies.

中文翻译：

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从敌人到没有好处的朋友：1908 年革命后奥斯曼-伊朗联盟的失败尝试

本文考察了 1908 年革命后，围绕奥斯曼帝国内奥斯曼帝国与伊朗联盟形成的历史发展和争论。它认为，尽管两国结盟的想法和建立联盟的尝试都不是新的，但在这一时期对其进行讨论、证明和推广的方式是不同的。奥斯曼帝国先前的尝试是由国家领导的，作为更广泛的泛伊斯兰项目的一部分（ittihad-ı伊斯兰) 采用了强烈的宗教语气。另一方面，在宪法时期，联盟的主要支持者大多是跨国/国际人物和宗教学者，他们在奥斯曼-伊朗关系的背景下提出了这一问题，重点关注当前的务实、战略和意识形态问题，例如就像通过宪政保护两国的主权和安全免受欧洲帝国主义的侵害。这些人没有像阿卜杜勒哈米德二世那样专注于调和逊尼派和什叶派之间的争端，也没有将这一联盟视为迈向更广泛的伊斯兰联盟的第一步，而是像阿卜杜勒哈米德二世在 19 世纪所做的那样，而是强调两个立宪派之间的兄弟情谊和团结各国政府，并试图建立基于共享边界的战略伙伴关系，