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Strategic Intelligence and International Crisis Behavior
Security Studies ( IF 3.032 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-03 , DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2020.1859128
Aleksandar Matovski

Abstract

High-quality strategic intelligence is commonly considered to be a stabilizing factor in international relations, steadying decision making and preventing misunderstandings and surprise attacks. This paper challenges this view by arguing that deep intelligence penetrations are some of the most destabilizing forces in high-stakes security crises. By exposing the opponents’ weaknesses and avenues of attack, intelligence penetration not only provides its beneficiaries with a potentially decisive offensive capability but also compels them to use it quickly, before the breach is discovered and the advantage is gone. Also, as the intelligence target is generally unaware of this capability, it does not serve as a deterrent that might force the target to the bargaining table. Thus, paradoxically, opposing sides are more likely to find a peaceful solution to crises when they do not have extensive strategic intelligence on each other.



中文翻译:

战略情报与国际危机行为

摘要

高质量的战略情报通常被认为是国际关系中的稳定因素,可以稳定决策并防止误解和意外袭击。本文通过争论深入的情报渗透是高风险安全危机中最不稳定的力量之一来挑战这一观点。通过暴露对手的弱点和攻击途径,情报渗透不仅可以为其受益者提供潜在的决定性进攻能力,而且还可以迫使他们在违规被发现并且优势消失之​​前迅速使用它。同样,由于情报目标通常不知道此功能,因此它不能作为威慑力量,可能会迫使目标进入谈判桌。因此,自相矛盾的是,

更新日期:2021-02-09
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