Abstract

Corporate governance theories suggest that concentrated ownership can be a mechanism for addressing the agency problem in a firm, and large shareholders matter for managerial decisions. Theoretically, the effect of large shareholders on innovation proxied by R&D is not determined yet, since their risk averseness and long-term time horizon affect R&D investment in opposite direction. It is quite unclear which effect is dominant. Thus, this issue should be explored by empirical evidence. The effect of ownership concentration on R&D investment is empirically examined by using firm-level panel data of Korea between 1980 and 2018. The empirical findings are: i) the effect of ownership on R&D is negative; ii) a bell-shaped relationship between ownership and R&D is observed; iii) the negative effect of ownership on R&D is found in old firms only; iv) the effect of ownership on R&D is positive for large firms and negative for small firms; and v) the effect of ownership on R&D is positive before the financial crisis.

摘要

公司治理理论表明，集中所有权可以成为解决公司代理问题的一种机制，大股东对管理决策很重要。从理论上讲，大股东对以研发为代表的创新的影响尚未确定，因为他们的风险厌恶和长期时间跨度对研发投资的影响方向相反。目前尚不清楚哪种效应占主导地位。因此，这个问题应该通过经验证据来探讨。利用韩国 1980 年至 2018 年的企业面板数据，实证检验了所有权集中度对研发投资的影响。实证结果是：i）所有权对研发的影响为负；ii) 观察到所有权和研发之间的钟形关系；iii) 所有权对研发的负面影响 D只存在于老公司中；iv) 所有权对研发的影响对大公司是积极的，对小公司是消极的；v) 在金融危机之前所有权对研发的影响是积极的。