We analyze the effects of strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on social welfare in an industry where firms are owned by consumers (publicly owned) and CSR commitment takes the form of a fraction of the consumer surplus into the firms’ objective function. We compare this market configuration with the standard case of firms owned by entrepreneurs (privately owned). In line with the empirical evidence, consumers’ ownership gives an incentive to adopt a socially responsible, welfare improving statute. While privately-owned companies are limited in the level of social concern to implement, publicly-owned companies are not, and CSR is welfare-improving for any level of social concern. Surprisingly, a market configuration of publicly-owned CSR companies decreases welfare compared to an oligopoly of privately-owned CSR companies. The analysis is then extended by considering asymmetric oligopolies with different company types.

我们分析了战略性企业社会责任（CSR）对一个行业的社会福利的影响，在该行业中，公司由消费者所有（公有），并且CSR承诺采取一部分消费者剩余的形式纳入公司的目标函数。我们将这种市场配置与企业家拥有的公司（私有）的标准案例进行比较。根据经验证据，消费者的所有权促使人们采取对社会负责，改善福利的法规。私营公司在实施社会关注方面受到限制，而上市公司则不受限制，而CSR可以提高社会关注的任何层面的福利。令人惊讶的是，与私有CSR公司的寡头垄断相比，公有CSR公司的市场配置降低了福利。