Objective

Many governments are using contact tracing mobile applications (CTMAs) yet public adoption of such systems has been relatively low. The main objective of this paper is to profile adopters (and non-adopters) of Australia’s COVIDSafe CTMA.

Materials and methods

We use latent profile analysis to examine predictors of CTMA download behaviour. Specifically, we draw on a representative Australian sample (N = 2575) to examine the interplay between age, education, income, dispositional desire for privacy and political ideology on download behaviour. We examine trust in government as a mediating mechanism between profiles and download behaviour.

Results

Our analysis produces seven profiles. Trust in government mediates the relationship between most profiles and download behaviour. A combination of wealth and education appear to be key explanatory factors of CTMA download behaviour. Two profiles -- comprising individuals with high income and education -- had the highest rates of download behaviour. Profiles with low download percentages comprised politically left-leaning participants with average to low income and education.

Conclusion

Our findings clearly indicate the profiles of people who are (not) likely to download a CTMA. Practical ways to improve widespread adoption include providing structural support to the more vulnerable members of society, making clear the societal benefits of downloading CTMAs, and engaging in bipartisan promotion of such apps.

中文翻译：

---

对跟踪联系人移动应用程序的采用者（和非采用者）进行概要分析：澳大利亚的见解

客观的

许多政府正在使用联系人跟踪移动应用程序（CTMA），但公众对此类系统的采用率相对较低。本文的主要目的是介绍澳大利亚COVIDSafe CTMA的采用者（和非采用者）。

材料和方法

我们使用潜在配置文件分析来检查CTMA下载行为的预测因子。具体来说，我们以澳大利亚为代表的样本（N = 2575）来考察年龄，教育程度，收入，对隐私的性倾向和下载行为的政治意识形态之间的相互影响。我们考察对政府的信任，将其作为个人资料和下载行为之间的中介机制。

结果

我们的分析产生七个轮廓。对政府的信任介导了大多数配置文件和下载行为之间的关系。财富和教育的结合似乎是CTMA下载行为的关键解释因素。由高收入和高学历的个人组成的两个配置文件具有最高的下载行为率。下载百分比低的个人资料包括政治倾向偏左的参与者，他们的平均收入和教育程度都较低。

结论

我们的发现清楚地表明了（不太可能）下载CTMA的人群的个人资料。改善广泛采用的实用方法包括为社会中较弱势的成员提供结构性支持，明确下载CTMA的社会利益，并参与两党对此类应用程序的推广。