I characterize the individually-rational utilitarian bargaining solution by combining several classical axioms with a novel axiom, monotone step-by-step negotiations (monotone SSN). One of the axioms involved in the characterization is conflict freeness, which imposes Pareto optimality on problems that include their ideal point; when conflict freeness is replaced by weak Pareto optimality, only one additional solution becomes admissible—the egalitarian solution. I also show that in Kalai’s (Econometrica 45:1623–1630, 1977) SSN-based characterization of the proportional solutions, SSN can be weakened to monotone SSN if feasible set continuity is assumed.

我通过将几种经典公理与一个新颖的公理，单调逐步谈判（单调SSN）相结合，来描述个别理性的功利议价解决方案。表征所涉及的公理之一是冲突自由，它使包括理想点在内的问题具有帕累托最优性。当用弱Pareto最优性代替自由冲突时，只有一种其他解决方案成为可接受的方案-平均主义解决方案。我还表明，在Kalai（Econometrica 45：1623–1630，1977）的基于SSN的比例解表征中，如果假设可行的集合连续性，则SSN可以弱化为单调SSN 。