Abstract We have two upstream firms producing each one a different good. Demands of the goods are independent, symmetric and linear. Goods are sold to consumers through retailers. The units of both goods sold by retailers cannot exceed the industry selling capacity that it is distributed symmetrically among retailers. Taking as given the industry selling capacity, when the number of retailers decreases, they become bigger in the sense that their selling capacity increases. Therefore, changing the number of retailers, we can check whether the countervailing power theory, that states that bigger retailers obtain better deals from suppliers, holds in our model. We obtain that the lower the number of retailers, the lower the wholesale prices, only when the industry selling capacity is high.

中文翻译：

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销售能力有限的零售商的购买力

摘要我们有两家上游公司，它们各自生产不同的商品。货物需求是独立的，对称的和线性的。商品通过零售商出售给消费者。零售商出售的两种商品的单位都不能超过其在零售商之间对称分配的行业销售能力。以给定的行业销售能力，当零售商数量减少时，从销售能力增加的意义上说，他们变得更大。因此，改变零售商的数量，我们可以检查一下反补贴理论，该理论认为更大的零售商从供应商那里获得更好的交易。我们发现只有在行业销售能力高的情况下，零售商的数量越少，批发价格越低。