ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates’ daimonion in The Concept of Irony should be read in light of his notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety, and vice versa. Whereas the first should primarily be seen as an exemplification of philosophical transcendental consciousness, the second assumes a more strictly ‘moral’ connotation (‘anxiety about the good’). If the notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety draws upon the Socratic daimonion in The Concept of Irony, this will have implications for philosophy and science in so far as they take a transcendental consciousness for granted. However, Kierkegaard’s continued reference to, if not identification with, Socrates, prevents us from immobilising Kierkegaard’s ‘own’ philosophy, as though the Socratic position can ever be definitively overcome. The ‘enclosed reserve’ of the demonic is rather philosophy’s weak spot.

中文翻译：

---

基尔凯郭尔对苏格拉底的雏菊

摘要在本文中，我认为，应根据克尔凯郭尔在《反讽的概念》中对苏格拉底的魔咒的解释来解读他的“恶魔概念”中的恶魔概念，反之亦然。尽管第一个应该主要被视为哲学先验意识的例证，但是第二个则具有更严格的“道德”内涵（“对商品的焦虑”）。如果“焦虑概念”中的恶魔概念借鉴了“反讽概念”中的苏格拉底式魔咒，那么这将对哲学和科学产生影响，只要他们认为先验意识是理所当然的。但是，基尔凯郭尔继续引用苏格拉底，即使不能与苏格拉底一视同仁，这使我们无法固执基尔凯郭尔的“自己的”哲学，仿佛可以彻底克服苏格拉底的立场。