ABSTRACT In ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Harry Frankfurt argues that a successful analysis of the concept ‘human’ must reveal something that distinguishes humans from non-humans, as well as indicate something informative about ‘those attributes [of ourselves] which are the subject of our most humane concern.’ In this paper, I present an analysis of Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ as it is employed within his Ethics. I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ satisfies Frankfurt’s desiderata because I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ is, at core, a version of Frankfurt’s own. I argue that Spinoza’s account of human bondage and human freedom indicate that Spinoza sees humans as beings that possess higher-order volitions, and that comments Spinoza makes throughout his corpus shows that he views beings that lack higher order desires to be, in an important sense, non-human. The analysis here sheds light upon the community of entities that Spinoza’s Ethics is written for, as well as upon issues concerning the nature of Spinoza’s Free Man.

中文翻译：

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斯宾诺莎论名义上定义人类条件的条件

摘要在“意志的自由和人的概念”中，哈里·法兰克福认为，对“人类”概念的成功分析必须揭示一些将人类与非人类区分开来的东西，并指出一些关于“这些属性”的信息。我们自己]这是我们最关心的主题。在这篇论文中，我对斯宾诺莎的“人”概念进行了分析，因为它在他的伦理学中被使用。我表明斯宾诺莎的“人”概念满足法兰克福的需求，因为我表明斯宾诺莎的“人”概念本质上是法兰克福自己的一个版本。我认为斯宾诺莎对人类束缚和人类自由的描述表明斯宾诺莎将人类视为拥有更高阶意志的存在，斯宾诺莎在他的整个语料库中所做的评论表明，他认为缺乏更高层次欲望的存在，在一个重要的意义上，非人类。这里的分析阐明了斯宾诺莎的伦理学所针对的实体社区，以及有关斯宾诺莎的自由人的性质的问题。