ABSTRACT The recent debate between conceptualists and phenomenologists, epitomized in the exchange between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus, has put on the table the age-old philosophical problem of the relationship between concepts and our embodied and embedded existence. The tension between our responsiveness to norms and meanings, on the one hand, and the fact that we are part of the animal kingdom, on the other, engenders difficulties for those committed to strong rationalistic programs along Kantian lines. Sellars, I argue, was better equipped to navigate this conundrum than most of his disciples in what has come to be known as the Pittsburgh School. Indeed, Sellars’s conception of rule-governed behavior, with its peculiar mixture of Kantian conceptualism and pragmatic naturalism, anticipates and successfully solves objections that have been leveled against contemporary neo-Hegelians like John McDowell and Robert Brandom by thinkers influenced by the phenomenological tradition of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. More importantly, in tying conceptual abilities with skillful coping, Sellars successfully manages to offer a story of how discursive intentionality enters the lives of creatures like us.

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生活在行为中的意义：遵守规则的塞拉斯

摘要 最近概念主义者和现象学家之间的争论，集中在约翰·麦克道威尔和休伯特·德雷福斯之间的交流中，把概念与我们具身和嵌入的存在之间的关系这一古老的哲学问题摆到了桌面上。一方面，我们对规范和意义的反应与我们是动物王国的一部分这一事实之间的紧张关系，给那些致力于遵循康德主义的强理性计划的人带来了困难。我认为，塞拉斯比他在后来被称为匹兹堡学派的大多数门徒更有能力解决这个难题。的确，塞拉斯关于受规则支配的行为的概念，以其独特的康德概念主义和实用自然主义的混合，预测并成功解决了受海德格尔、梅洛-庞蒂和萨特等现象学传统影响的思想家对约翰麦克道威尔和罗伯特布兰朗等当代新黑格尔主义者提出的反对意见。更重要的是，通过将概念能力与熟练的应对联系起来，塞拉斯成功地提供了一个关于话语意向如何进入像我们这样的生物的生活的故事。