ABSTRACT According to a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the use of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the relevant conceptual norms. Recently, Ginsborg raises two important objections against this view. According to her, the normativity Brandom ascribes to concepts lacks the internalist or first-person character of normativity that Kant’s view demands, and the relevant normativity belongs properly not to concepts as such, but rather to belief or assertion. The purpose of this paper is to defend a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against these objections.

中文翻译：

---

金斯伯格论康德-布朗的概念观

摘要 根据康德-布兰诺的概念观，我们可以根据约束应用者的规范或规则来理解概念，并且概念的使用要求概念使用者对相关的概念规范敏感。最近，金斯伯格对这一观点提出了两个重要的反对意见。在她看来，布兰登归于概念的规范性缺乏康德观点所要求的规范性的内在主义或第一人称特征，相关的规范性不属于概念本身，而是属于信念或断言。本文的目的是为反对这些反对意见而捍卫康德-布朗尼式的概念观点。