ABSTRACT This paper seeks to shed light on the often-overlooked account of divine and human freedom presented by Anne Conway in her Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy, partly through a comparison with the theory of freedom offered by her philosophical mentor, Henry More. After outlining More’s theory of freedom, explored in a number of different works, I argue that, given evidence from correspondence regarding Conway’s familiarity with More’s work, and the timing of the writing of the notes that would be compiled in the Principles, it is highly likely that she has his account of freedom in mind when she offers her own theory of divine and human freedom. Further, I argue that whilst they both agree in attributing substantive freedom to both God and human beings, the Principles crucially departs from More’s philosophy in refraining from limiting freedom to human beings alone but extending it to all creatures. However, I argue that the question of whether Conway follows More in allowing for the possibility of human beings to develop morally to the extent that they attain a good nature and no longer have indifference of the will in a strict sense is unclear.

中文翻译：

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安妮康威和亨利更多关于自由

摘要 本文旨在阐明安妮·康威 (Anne Conway) 在其《最古老的现代哲学原理》(Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy) 中经常被忽视的关于神圣和人类自由的论述，部分是通过与她的哲学导师亨利·莫尔 (Henry More) 提供的自由理论进行比较。在概述了莫尔的自由理论并在许多不同的作品中进行了探索之后，我认为，鉴于康威对莫尔的作品的熟悉程度以及撰写将在原则中汇编的笔记的时间，我认为这是高度当她提出自己的神圣和人类自由理论时，她很可能想到了他对自由的解释。此外，我认为虽然他们都同意将实质性的自由归于上帝和人类，这些原则与莫尔的哲学截然不同，它避免将自由限制在人类本身，而是将其扩展到所有生物。然而，我认为康威是否遵循莫尔，允许人类在道德上发展到他们获得良好的本性并且不再具有严格意义上的意志冷漠的可能性的问题尚不清楚。