ABSTRACT The question whether a constitutive linguistic norm can be prescriptive is central to the debate on the normativity of meaning. Recently, the author has attempted to defend an affirmative answer, pointing to how speakers sporadically invoke constitutive linguistic norms in the service of linguistic calibration. Such invocations are clearly prescriptive. However, they are only appropriate if the invoked norms are applicable to the addressed speaker. But that can only be the case if the speaker herself generally accepts them. This qualification has led critics to argue that if an addressed speaker’s acceptance is a necessary condition for legitimate prescriptions (and reproach for failure to adhere to them), then the account becomes unable to underwrite actual normativity. Moreover, critics argue, a danger of vicious circularity arises from the calibration account. This paper shows that once a vantage point within the calibration practice is accepted, the criticisms lose their force. It then explores why a theorist might reject such a perspective and suggests, as a plausible candidate, implicit Humean assumptions about the proper explanation of (linguistic) action. The paper ends by sketching a way forward for the debate on the normativity of meaning in light of this diagnosis.

中文翻译：

---

关于受语言规范的约束。回复 Reinikainen 和 Kaluziński

摘要 一个构成性语言规范是否可以规定性的问题是关于意义规范性辩论的核心。最近，作者试图为一个肯定的答案辩护，指出说话者如何在语言校准服务中偶尔援引构成性语言规范。这样的调用显然是规定性的。但是，它们仅适用于所引用的规范适用于演讲者的情况。但只有在演讲者本人普遍接受它们的情况下，情况才会如此。这种限定导致批评者争辩说，如果演讲者的接受是合法规定的必要条件（以及对未能遵守规定的谴责），那么该说明就无法保证实际的规范性。此外，批评者认为，校准帐户存在恶性循环的危险。本文表明，一旦接受校准实践中的一个有利位置，批评就会失去效力。然后探讨了为什么理论家可能会拒绝这种观点，并建议作为一个合理的候选者，对（语言）行为的正确解释提出隐含的休谟假设。本文最后根据这一诊断勾勒出关于意义规范性辩论的前进方向。