ABSTRACT The publication of the revised edition of Place and Experience provides the occasion to discuss Malpas’ original account of place, and its role in a proper account of the central features of human minds. The first edition is a groundbreaking work on the embodiment and embeddedness of human minds, that prefigures more recent developments of a now established field of research on embodied minds: so-called E accounts. In this paper, I address three issues in Malpas’ book that I found problematic at times and unclear at others, and argue that E- accounts, or better, a particular rendering of them, can better dissolve. These interrelated issues are: 1. the use of the idea of mental representations to understand location and orientation; 2. the claim that non-human animals have ‘environments’ but lack ‘worlds’, 3. the use of two exclusive vocabularies, the physical and the mental, for describing cognition. I thus question such ideas, associated with traditional accounts of cognition, which not only are responsible for some of the gravest criticisms such accounts have received, but seem inadequate to Malpas’ characterization of minds as placed. My recommendation is to take a step back from the traditional framework, and allow ourselves to simply move forward.

中文翻译：

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退后一步，前进：没有心理表征的地方和空间

摘要 《地方与经验》修订版的出版提供了讨论马尔帕斯对地方的原始描述及其在正确描述人类思想中心特征中的作用的机会。第一版是关于人类思想的体现和嵌入性的开创性工作，预示着现在已经建立的体现思想研究领域的最新发展：所谓的 E 账户。在这篇论文中，我解决了 Malpas 书中的三个问题，这些问题我有时发现有问题，而在其他问题上不清楚，并认为电子账户，或者更好的，它们的特定渲染，可以更好地解散。这些相互关联的问题是： 1. 使用心理表征的概念来理解位置和方向；2.非人类动物有“环境”但缺乏“世界”的说法，3. 使用物理和心理两个专有词汇来描述认知。因此，我质疑与传统认知解释相关的这些想法，这些想法不仅要为此类解释所收到的一些最严重的批评负责，而且似乎不适合马尔帕斯对思想的描述。我的建议是从传统框架中退后一步，让我们自己向前迈进。