ABSTRACT For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention.

中文翻译：

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西蒙娜·威尔：痛苦伦理和注意力美学

摘要 对于西蒙娜·威尔来说，援引“权利”来解决极端的人类苦难——她称之为“痛苦”——是“荒谬的不足”。Weil 认为，权利需要回应，而受折磨的人需要的不是对话，而只是被倾听。对威尔来说，听到受苦者的“呐喊”是一切正义的基础。这种听证会的任务交给了 Weil 的注意力概念，这需要创造性沉默的伦理。本文将论证，Weil 的关注伦理以及她认为我们应该表现出同情和公正行为的方式的核心是康德主义的无私美学概念。我会争辩说，虽然威尔在多种方面受到康德的影响，但在她自己的注意力伦理理论中，最重要的是他的美学，而不是他的规范道德理论。