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The Middle Wittgenstein’s Critique of Frege
International Journal of Philosophical Studies ( IF 0.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-01-01 , DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2020.1716384
Piotr Dehnel 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT This article aims to analyse Wittgenstein’s 1929–1932 notes concerning Frege’s critique of what is referred to as old formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with Frege’s critique and, in his notes, outlined his own assessment of formalism. First of all, he approvingly foregrounded its mathematics-game comparison and insistence that rules precede the meanings of expressions. In this article, I recount Frege’s critique of formalism and address Wittgenstein’s assessment of it to show that his remarks are not so much a critique of Frege as rather a defence of the formalist anti-metaphysical investment.

中文翻译:

中维特根斯坦对弗雷格的批判

摘要 本文旨在分析维特根斯坦 1929-1932 年关于弗雷格对数学哲学中所谓的旧形式主义的批判的笔记。维特根斯坦不同意弗雷格的批评,并在他的笔记中概述了他自己对形式主义的评价。首先,他赞同地将其数学游戏比较放在首位,并坚持规则先于表达式的含义。在这篇文章中,我回顾了弗雷格对形式主义的批判,并阐述了维特根斯坦对其的评价,以表明他的评论与其说是对弗雷格的批判,不如说是对形式主义的反形而上学投资的辩护。
更新日期:2020-01-01
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