ABSTRACT Ralph Cudworth’s goal in his manuscript writings on freewill is to argue that our actions are in our own power in a robust sense that entails the power to do otherwise. Cudworth’s unorthodox views about desire threaten to undermine this project, however. Cudworth maintains that only desire is able to distinguish good and evil and, consequently, that desire alone motivates our actions. Therefore, since Cudworth holds that desire itself is not in our own power, he appears committed to the conclusion that our actions are not in our own power either. Cudworth’s solution, I argue, is to emphasize our inward responses to desire, which he does take to be in our own power. I focus in particular on attention: by directing attention differently in response to desire, Cudworth holds that we are able actively to influence the way in which desire motivates our actions. Our actions are in our own power, therefore, only because such inward responses to desire are in our own power.

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自由的内在工作：Cudworth 关于欲望和注意力

摘要 拉尔夫·库德沃斯 (Ralph Cudworth) 在他关于自由意志的手稿中的目标是论证我们的行为在我们自己的权力范围内，在强大的意义上意味着我们有能力做其他事情。然而，库德沃斯关于欲望的非正统观点有可能破坏这个项目。库德沃斯坚持认为，只有欲望才能区分善恶，因此，只有欲望才能激发我们的行动。因此，由于库德沃斯认为欲望本身不在我们自己的能力范围内，因此他似乎致力于得出结论，即我们的行为也不在我们自己的能力范围内。我认为，库德沃斯的解决方案是强调我们对欲望的内在反应，他确实认为这是在我们自己的能力范围内。我特别关注注意力：通过以不同的方式引导注意力以响应欲望，库德沃斯认为，我们能够积极影响欲望激励我们行动的方式。因此，我们的行动是在我们自己的能力范围内，因为这种对欲望的内在反应是在我们自己的能力范围内。