ABSTRACT In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in character; second, he does not believe now that the content of an experience needs to include everything the experience enables us to know non-inferentially. In this article, I take issue with both retractions. My thesis is that McDowell’s first version of perceptual content is preferable to the latest one.

中文翻译：

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经验概念内容的两个版本

摘要在“避免给定的神话”中，麦克道尔重新审视了心灵与世界的主题，以做出两个重要的修正：第一，他不再相信知觉体验的内容具有命题性质；其次，他现在不相信经验的内容需要包括经验使我们能够以非推理方式知道的一切。在本文中，我对这两个撤回提出异议。我的论点是 McDowell 的第一个感知内容版本比最新版本更可取。