Investor-driven 'short-termism' is said to harm EU public firms' ability to invest for the long term, prompting calls for the EU to better insulate managers from shareholder pressure. But the evidence offered—rising levels of repurchases and dividends—is incomplete and misleading: it ignores large offsetting equity issuances that move capital from investors to EU firms. We show that, over the last 30 years and the last decade, net shareholder payouts have been moderate and investment and cash balances have increased. In sum, the data provide little basis for the view that short-termism in the EU warrants corporate governance reforms.

中文翻译：

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短期主义、股东派息和在欧盟的投资

据称，投资者驱动的“短期主义”损害了欧盟上市公司的长期投资能力，促使欧盟呼吁更好地使管理人员免受股东压力。但所提供的证据——不断上升的回购和股息水平——是不完整和具有误导性的：它忽略了将资本从投资者转移到欧盟公司的大量抵消性股票发行。我们表明，在过去 30 年和过去 10 年中，股东的净支出一直温和，投资和现金余额有所增加。总而言之，这些数据几乎没有为以下观点提供依据，即欧盟的短期主义需要进行公司治理改革。