Richard Nixon's August 1971 announcement of a set of policies known collectively as the New Economic Policy (NEP), or the ‘Nixon shock’, effectively terminated the Bretton Woods system (BWS) of fixed exchange rates that had governed the international monetary system since 1944. While there are many accounts of Nixon's decision to end the BWS, the secret Nixon White House tapes provide unique insights into the decision-making process and Nixon's struggle with this decision. Using the tapes as evidence, we find that Nixon resisted ending the BWS for political reasons and did not fully understand the NEP's strategy, particularly the fact that the domestic policies were designed to provide cover for the international policies. The tapes also clarify that the decision to adopt the NEP was made prior to the Camp David Summit of 13–15 August 1971 in response to general speculative pressure. While the US reacted to pressure on the dollar, Nixon and Treasury Secretary John Connally attempted to appear to be driving decisions for the domestic electorate. The temporary float of exchange rates as part of the NEP inevitably became permanent as a result of Nixon's choice of advisors and his preferences for open capital flows and stimulative monetary policy.

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结束布雷顿森林体系：来自尼克松录音带的证据†

理查德尼克松 1971 年 8 月宣布了一系列统称为新经济政策 (NEP) 或“尼克松冲击”的政策，有效地终止了自 1944 年以来一直支配国际货币体系的布雷顿森林体系 (BWS) . 虽然有很多关于尼克松决定结束 BWS 的叙述，但尼克松白宫的秘密录音提供了对决策过程和尼克松与这一决定的斗争的独特见解。使用录音作为证据，我们发现尼克松出于政治原因拒绝结束 BWS，并且没有完全理解新经济政策的战略，特别是国内政策旨在为国际政策提供掩护的事实。录像带还澄清了采用新经济政策的决定是在 1971 年 8 月 13 日至 15 日戴维营峰会之前做出的，以应对普遍的投机压力。当美国对美元的压力做出反应时，尼克松和财政部长约翰康纳利试图表现出推动国内选民的决定。由于尼克松对顾问的选择以及他对开放资本流动和刺激性货币政策的偏好，作为新经济政策一部分的临时汇率浮动不可避免地成为永久性的。