This paper shows that investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) make multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline.

中文翻译：

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投资者-国家争端解决与跨国公司行为

本文表明，投资者与国家之间的争端解决机制 (ISDS) 通过增加降低成本的投资以扩大 ISDS 条款可能提供的潜在补偿，从而使跨国公司更加积极。更大的投资在减少市场扭曲的同时，也会使潜在的补偿更大。因此，对外国投资者的潜在补偿并不意味着零和游戏。ISDS 可能会降低国内福利，特别是如果投资导致建立出口平台，我们发现甚至全球福利可能会下降。