This paper compares the first-price auction and the second-price auction with several asymmetric bidders who are either weak or strong. The ranking of these auctions in terms of profit may flip as the exogenous reserve price or the number of weak or strong bidders change. Similarly, with endogenous reserve prices the ranking may depend on the seller’s own-use valuation. In other words, the ranking may be fragile to changes along these dimensions. Existing models rule out such ranking reversals by imposing substantial structure on type distributions. The current paper relies on simple mechanism design arguments that require less structure.

中文翻译：

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非对称拍卖中的排名逆转

本文将第一价格拍卖和第二价格拍卖与几个弱或强的非对称投标人进行了比较。这些拍卖在利润方面的排名可能会随着外生底价或弱或强投标人数量的变化而发生变化。同样，对于内生底价，排名可能取决于卖方的自用估值。换句话说，排名可能会受到这些维度上的变化的影响。现有模型通过对类型分布强加实质性结构来排除这种排名反转。当前的论文依赖于需要较少结构的简单机制设计论点。