ABSTRACT In this paper, we study crony capitalism through the lens of Moroccan listed companies and the role of the financial sector. We first highlight the role of banks in the history of Moroccan capitalism from the setting up of the French protectorate over Morocco to the dominance of some major family groups. Using a network analysis of board members of the Moroccan listed companies we confirm the centrality of finance compared to other sectors. We also measure the relational proximity to demonstrate that each cluster of the four main holding families has at least one financial company. Finally, we argue that crony interlockers, who are members of royal foundations and represent an institutional investor or a holding family that owns a bank and/or an insurance company, are the most central actors in the network of listed companies. Our contribution to crony capitalism in MENA analyses the politics of finance in a neoliberal and peripheral country such as Morocco. Boone and Henry [(2004). Neoliberalism in the Middle East and Africa: Divergent banking reform trajectories, 1980s to 2000. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 42(3), 356–392] had described the banking sector in Morocco as a private oligopoly. Here, we provide evidence that the monarchy and its entourage are capturing corporate governance instruments such as board membership to control economic activities.

中文翻译：

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crony连锁店和银行的中心地位：摩洛哥上市公司网络

摘要在本文中，我们通过摩洛哥上市公司和金融部门的角色来研究裙带资本主义。我们首先强调银行在摩洛哥资本主义历史上的作用，从法国对摩洛哥的保护国的建立到一些主要家庭集团的统治。通过对摩洛哥上市公司董事会成员的网络分析，我们确认了金融与其他行业相比的中心地位。我们还测量了关系接近度，以证明四个主要控股家族的每个集群至少都有一个金融公司。最后，我们争辩说，王室连锁店是皇家基金会的成员，代表拥有银行和/或保险公司的机构投资者或控股家族，是上市公司网络中最主要的参与者。我们在中东和北非地区对裙带资本主义的贡献分析了摩洛哥等新自由主义和外围国家的金融政治。布恩和亨利[（2004）。中东和非洲的新自由主义：1980年代至2000年不同的银行业改革轨迹。英联邦与比较政治，第42（3）期，第356-392页]将摩洛哥的银行业描述为私人寡头。在这里，我们提供了证据表明君主制及其随行人员正在捕获诸如董事会成员资格之类的公司治理工具以控制经济活动。[356–392]曾将摩洛哥的银行业描述为私人寡头。在这里，我们提供了证据表明君主制及其随行人员正在捕获诸如董事会成员资格之类的公司治理工具以控制经济活动。[356–392]曾将摩洛哥的银行业描述为私人寡头。在这里，我们提供了证据表明君主制及其随行人员正在捕获诸如董事会成员资格之类的公司治理工具以控制经济活动。