A growing body of literature has recently discussed the access of migrants to property rights over assets as a requirement for the protection of their human rights and basic interests. Little attention has been paid, however, to the fact that the right to decide over an individual’s migration to a given place is itself a property right. This paper aims to close this gap by describing international treaties regarding migration as mechanisms to transfer bundles of such property rights. This approach embarks to compare the distributional effects of different treaties regarding migration. It also aims to demonstrate that such treaties often do not limit themselves to transactions of property rights among States, but are capable of transferring property rights from States to individuals. A property rights approach highlights that the exclusion of would-be immigrants from would-be receiving countries means to impose a (negative) external effect on them and their country of origin. A review of different types of treaties demonstrates the tendency in all of these treaties to internalise such external effects. The paper thus predicts that the prevention of migration will get more expensive as the external effects of this activity will have to be internalised to a growing degree.

中文翻译：

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一捆捆绑的权利-根据产权理论的关于移民的国际条约

最近，越来越多的文献讨论了移徙者获得资产的财产权是保护其人权和基本利益的要求。但是，很少有人关注这样一个事实，即就某人的移居到某个地方的决定权本身就是一项财产权。本文旨在通过描述将移徙作为转移此类财产权的机制的国际条约来弥合这一差距。这种方法着手比较不同条约对移民的分配影响。它还旨在表明，此类条约通常不局限于国家之间的产权交易，而是能够将产权从国家转让给个人。财产权方法强调指出，将潜在移民排除在潜在接受国之外意味着对他们及其原籍国施加（负面）外部影响。对不同类型条约的审查表明，所有这些条约都趋向于内化这种外部影响。因此，该论文预测，由于必须将这种活动的外部影响内化到越来越大的程度，因此防止迁移的费用将更高。