How can we understand the social and economic dynamics that enable the operative space of the militant networks in northern Mali? This article argues that jihadist militant groups are actors in local power struggles rather than ‘fighters’ or ‘terrorists’ with extremist ideological motivations. I argue that the sharp distinctions drawn by the Malian government and the international community between compliant and non-compliant groups in the implementation of the peace agreement from June 2015 is problematic. Understanding the conflicts in northern Mali requires an increased focus on the links between jihadist militant groups, local politics and criminal network activities in Gao and Kidal.

中文翻译：

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作为“沙漠生意”的伊斯兰教法：了解马里北部犯罪网络与圣战主义之间的联系

我们如何理解使马里北部激进网络的活动空间成为可能的社会和经济动态？本文认为，圣战激进组织是地方权力斗争的参与者，而不是具有极端意识形态动机的“战士”或“恐怖分子”。我认为，马里政府和国际社会在执行 2015 年 6 月的和平协议过程中对顺从和不顺从的团体进行了明确区分，这是有问题的。了解马里北部的冲突需要更多地关注加奥和基达尔的圣战激进组织、当地政治和犯罪网络活动之间的联系。