This paper analyzes whether and how model uncertainty affects the amplification mechanism of the New Keynesian models in a simple min-max framework where the central bank plays a zero-sum game versus a hypothetical, evil agent. A first finding on a benchmark model with staggered price setting is that a robust optimal commitment policy necessitates more aggressive policy under a demand shock. Further, bringing additional persistence into the model deteriorates the effectiveness of monetary policy. Hence, allowing for either habit formation or partial indexation of prices to lagged inflation rate requires a stronger response for the policy to a demand shock. Together with the specification doubts, in order to reassure the private sector and signal that it will stabilize the fluctuations in the output gap, the policymaker reacts more aggressively as persistence rises. Although inflation persistence does not change the impact of model uncertainty, habit formation in consumption eliminates even reverses the impact of uncertainty on the policy reaction to a supply shock. In all cases, policymaker attributes less importance to nominal interest rate inertia with concerns about model uncertainty.

中文翻译：

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新凯恩斯主义模型的放大和稳健的最优货币政策

本文分析了模型不确定性是否以及如何在简单的最小-最大框架中影响新凯恩斯模型的放大机制，在该框架中，中央银行扮演零和游戏，而假设角色则是邪恶的。价格交错的基准模型的第一个发现是，稳健的最佳承诺政策需要在需求冲击下采取更激进的政策。此外，将额外的持久性引入模型会降低货币政策的有效性。因此，允许习惯养成或将价格部分指数化为滞后的通货膨胀率，需要对政策对需求冲击的更强有力的响应。连同对规范的怀疑，为了使私营部门放心并发出信号，它将稳定产出缺口的波动，随着持续性的提高，决策者会做出更加积极的反应。尽管通货膨胀的持久性不会改变模型不确定性的影响，但消费中的习惯形成甚至消除了不确定性对政策对供应冲击的反应的影响。在所有情况下，决策者都对模型的不确定性赋予了名义利率惯性较少的重视。