Abstract Robert Brandom’s notion of historical rationality seeks to supplement his inferentialism thesis by providing an account for the validity of conceptual contents. This account, in the shape of a historical process, involves the same self-integration of Brandom’s earlier inferentialism and is similarly restricted by reciprocal recognition of others. This article argues that in applying the synchronic social model of normative discourse to the diachronic axis of engaging the past, Brandom premises a false analogy between present community and past tradition, which obscures the important differences between the two axes. This is explored by looking closely at how Brandom’s own engagements with the past exemplify his historical rationality. Taking its cue from Brandom’s critics, the article shows that Brandom’s own discourse with tradition is not, and cannot be, dialogical and, in accordance, that historical rationality is not, and cannot be, governed by the same social structure of inferentialism. The article concludes with the implications of such a claim on Brandom’s thesis as a whole and on the role of tradition in the process of normative change, in light of it.

中文翻译：

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与传统对话：白兰度的历史合理性

摘要罗伯特·布兰登（Robert Brandom）的历史合理性概念旨在通过解释概念内容的有效性来补充其推论论点。这种解释以历史过程的形式出现，涉及布兰登早期推论的相同自我整合，并且同样受到他人相互认可的限制。本文认为，在将规范性话语的共时社会模型应用于参与过去的历时轴时，布兰登假设当前社区与过去传统之间存在错误的类比，从而掩盖了这两个轴之间的重要差异。通过仔细观察布兰登自己与过去的交往如何证明他的历史合理性来探索这一点。从白兰度的批评者那里得到线索，该文章表明，白兰度自己关于传统的论述不是，也不能是对话的，并且据此，历史的理性也不是也不能由推论的相同社会结构支配。本文的结论是这样的主张对勃兰登姆的论文整体以及根据其对传统在规范变革过程中的作用的启示。