Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) has existed since the late 1990s as an outgrowth of my interpretation of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.1 As a group research program it is less than a decade old, stemming from a pair of conferences held in 2010 at Georgia Tech (April) and UCLA (December). Since then it has become one of the leading theoretical discourses in contemporary architecture, and has been almost as influential in the visual arts. This no doubt owes much to the central philosophical status accorded by OOO to aesthetics. Within the discipline of philosophy itself, although OOO’s references are largely continental in character, it has received a rather cool reception from mainstream American continental philosophy as embodied by SPEP (Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy). Nonetheless, it has received a more eager hearing from philosophers in continental Europe itself. OOO is usually characterized as insisting upon the “withdrawal” or unknowability of entities. Yet this is not sufficiently precise, given that the same could easily be said about Heidegger and Immanuel Kant, without even searching for less prominent figures. Perhaps a more helpful formulation would be that OOO in my version –as opposed to that of Levi R. Bryant– stresses the intersection of two distinct dualities.2 The first of these is indeed the Heideggerian distinction between the revealed and the concealed, which I now prefer to call “withholding” rather than “withdrawal,” given that the latter term falsely suggests a supplemental act of movement rather than the non-presence of entities from the outset. Perhaps the bigger problem is that for Heidegger as for Kant, finitude is treated as a unique burden haunting human beings alone, while for OOO even brute causal relations fail to deploy the full reality of the objects taking part in them. OOO’s second main duality is that between objects and their qualities. The model and inspiration on this point is Edmund Husserl, who distinguishes between the “intentional object” of experience (OOO’s “sensual object”) and two different types of qualities: the accidental qualities found in the “adumbrations” (Abschattungen) of objects as perceived by the senses, and the deeper and more important qualities that Husserl –though not OOO– holds can be intuited by the intellect. As mentioned, the first axis of withdrawn/present is usually taken to be the key concern of OOO. But in many ways it makes more sense to interpret OOO as preoccupied with the four basic forms of object/ quality tension: real object-sensual quality (RO-sheds light the central status of aesthetic SQ), real objectreal quality (RO-RQ), sensual object-sensual quality (SO-SQ), and sensual object-real quality (SO-RQ).3 OOO’s focus on the tense relations between objects and their own qualities, which both do and do not belong to them, sheds light on the central status of aesthetics in this philosophy; the aesthetic sphere gives us an unusually clear case of the production of objects that cannot be reduced to literal paraphrase or other prose explanation. The artwork remains inexhaustible, as seen already by Kant in his suspicion of rules

中文翻译：

---

主题“面向对象的本体及其批评”的社论介绍

自1990年代末以来，面向对象的本体（OOO）一直存在，这是我对马丁·海德格尔（Martin Heidegger）的哲学解释的产物。1作为一个小组研究计划，它成立不到十年，源于2010年在佐治亚理工学院（4月）和加州大学洛杉矶分校（12月）。从那时起，它已成为当代建筑学中最主要的理论论述之一，并且在视觉艺术领域几乎具有同等影响力。毫无疑问，这很大程度上归功于OOO赋予美学的中心哲学地位。在哲学学科本身内，尽管OOO的参考文献在很大程度上是大陆性的，但它受到SPEP（现象学和存在哲学学会）所体现的美国主流大陆哲学的相当冷漠的欢迎。尽管如此，欧洲大陆本身的哲学家们更渴望听到它的声音。OOO通常的特征是坚持实体的“退出”或不可知。但这还不够精确，因为对于海德格尔和伊曼纽尔·康德，人们很容易就可以说出同样的话，而无需寻找不太突出的人物。也许更有用的表述是，我的版本中的OOO与莱维·R·科比相反，强调了两个截然不同的二元性的交汇处。2首先，确实是海德格尔式的显性和隐性之间的区别，我鉴于后者一词错误地暗示了补充行动，而不是从一开始就不存在实体，因此现在更喜欢称其为“预扣”而不是“提款”。也许更大的问题是，对于海德格尔和康德而言，有限性被视为是困扰人类的独特负担，而对于OOO甚至残酷的因果关系也无法充分发挥参与其中的物体的真实性。OOO的第二个主要对偶性是对象及其质量之间的对偶性。这方面的模型和灵感来自埃德蒙·胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl），他将经验的“有意客体”（OOO的“感官客体”）与两种不同类型的特质区分开来：在物体的“预言”中发现的偶然特质是感官可以感知到，而胡塞尔（尽管不是OOO）所拥有的更深，更重要的特质可以通过理智来理解。如上所述，撤回/存在的第一个轴通常被视为OOO的关键问题。但是从很多方面来说，将OOO解释为关注对象/质量张力的四种基本形式更有意义：真实的对象感官质量（RO棚照亮了美学SQ的中心地位），真实的对象真实质量（RO-RQ） ，感官对象感官品质（SO-SQ）和感官对象真实感品质（SO-RQ）。3OOO专注于对象与它们本身的品质之间的时态关系，它们既属于也属于不属于它们论美学在这一哲学中的核心地位；审美领域为我们提供了一个异常清晰的案例，说明不能将其简化为文字释义或其他散文解释。正如康德在怀疑规则时已经看到的那样，艺术品仍然取之不尽。真实的物体感官质量（RO棚照亮了美学SQ的中心状态），真实的物体真实感质量（RO-RQ），感官的物体感官质量（SO-SQ）和感官的物体真实感质量（SO-RQ）。 3 OOO专注于物体与它们本身不属于和不属于它们的品质之间的紧张关系，这阐明了美学在这一哲学中的核心地位；审美领域为我们提供了一个异常清晰的案例，说明不能将其简化为文字释义或其他散文解释。正如康德在怀疑规则时已经看到的那样，艺术品仍然取之不尽。真实的物体感官质量（RO棚照亮了美学SQ的中心状态），真实的物体真实感质量（RO-RQ），感官的物体感官质量（SO-SQ）和感官的物体真实感质量（SO-RQ）。 3 OOO专注于物体与它们本身不属于和不属于它们的品质之间的紧张关系，这阐明了美学在这一哲学中的核心地位；审美领域为我们提供了一个异常清晰的案例，说明不能将其简化为文字释义或其他散文解释。正如康德在怀疑规则时已经看到的那样，艺术品仍然取之不尽。两者都属于和不属于它们，阐明了美学在这一哲学中的中心地位；审美领域为我们提供了一个异常清晰的案例，说明不能将其简化为文字释义或其他散文解释。正如康德在怀疑规则时已经看到的那样，艺术品仍然取之不尽。两者都属于和不属于它们，阐明了美学在这一哲学中的中心地位；审美领域为我们提供了一个异常清晰的案例，说明不能将其简化为文字释义或其他散文解释。正如康德在怀疑规则时已经看到的那样，艺术品仍然取之不尽。