Abstract This article poses a question for Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) in general and Harman’s position in particular. It is Heidegger’s question: “How do matters stand with nothingness?” First, I present the basic outline of Harman’s OOO which is presented as a theory of everything. In order to pin down the question of nothing, I begin by asking about “something”: what is an object? And what does it mean that objects exist? Then I pursue by identifying two notions of nothing in OOO: the withdrawal of objects and the in-between of two objects. The first, I call infrastructural nothing. The second, I call interrelational nothing. The latter is derived from the former. I argue that OOO is very close to Kierkegaard’s account of nothing as the space of possibility of possibilities, since an object is defined as its own interior space which must hold something in reserve in order to allow for change and emergence. Nothing is not merely nothing but something – a bounded openness.

中文翻译：

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万事无物：在面向对象的本体论中，什么都不存在？

摘要本文提出了一个普遍的面向对象本体（OOO）问题，尤其是Harman的立场。海德格尔的问题是：“事情在虚无中如何站立？” 首先，我介绍了哈曼OOO的基本轮廓，将其作为一切理论进行了介绍。为了确定什么都不是的问题，我首先要问“某物”：什么是物体？物体存在意味着什么？然后，我通过在OOO中确定两个无意义的概念来追求：对象的撤回和两个对象之间的介入。首先，我称基础设施为空。第二，我称无关系。后者源自前者。我认为，OOO非常接近Kierkegaard关于无数可能性的描述，因为物体被定义为自己的内部空间，必须保留一些东西以允许变化和出现。没有什么不仅是什么，而是什么-有限的开放性。