Abstract The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.

中文翻译：

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第二性的两种观念

摘要第二自然的概念有望为如何调和自然与理性提供解释。但是这个概念充满歧义。一方面，第二自然被理解为将所有认知活动结合在一起的自然。另一方面，第二自然被认为是一种可以通过认知活动改变的自然。本文试图通过将康德的第二自然概念与黑格尔的概念区分开来研究这种歧义。它认为，将康德观念的核心从第一自然的存在转变为第二自然的存在的想法是错误的。黑格尔的观念表明，所讨论的转变发生在第二自然本身内。从而，