ABSTRACT This essay aims to contribute robust grounds to question the Susskinds’ influential, consequentialist logic when it comes to the legitimacy of automation within the legal profession. It does so by questioning their minimalist understanding of the professions. If it is our commitment to moral equality that is at stake every time lawyers (fail to) hail the specific vulnerability inherent in their professional relationship, the case for wholesale automation is turned on its head. One can no longer assume that, as a rule, wholesale automation is both legitimate and desirable, provided it improves the quality and accessibility of legal services (in an accountable and maximally transparent way). The assumption, instead, is firmly in favour of designing systems that better enable legal professionals to live up to their specific responsibility. The rest of the essay outlines key challenges in the design of such profession-specific, ‘ethics aware’ decision-support systems.

中文翻译：

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计算机系统适合法律职业吗？

摘要 本文旨在为质疑 Susskinds 在法律行业内自动化的合法性方面具有影响力的后果论逻辑提供有力的依据。它通过质疑他们对职业的极简理解来做到这一点。如果每次律师（未能）称赞他们的专业关系中固有的特定脆弱性时，我们对道德平等的承诺都处于危险之中，那么批发自动化的案例就会发生逆转。人们不能再假设，作为一项规则，批发自动化既合法又可取，前提是它提高了法律服务的质量和可及性（以负责任和最大程度透明的方式）。相反，这种假设坚决支持设计能够更好地使法律专业人士履行其特定责任的系统。