ABSTRACT The judicial appointments regime in England and Wales is unbalanced. The pre-2005 appointments regime conferred excessive discretion on the Lord Chancellor, but the post-2005 regime has gone much too far in the opposite direction. Today, the Lord Chancellor is almost entirely excluded from the process of selecting lower level judges and enjoys only limited say over the selection of senior judges. In this article I argue that the current regime places too little weight on the sound reasons for involving the minister in individual selection decisions, including the scope for ministerial input to enhance judicial independence, to supply political leadership on judicial diversity and to render more effective the discharge of the Lord Chancellor’s systemic responsibility for the justice system as a whole. I argue that shortlists reconcile the need to more fully involve the Lord Chancellor whilst at the same time ensuring that candidates satisfy a merit threshold.

中文翻译：

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重新思考大法官在司法任命中的作用

摘要 英格兰和威尔士的司法任命制度是不平衡的。2005 年之前的任命制度赋予了大法官过多的自由裁量权，但 2005 年之后的制度在相反的方向上走得太远了。今天，大法官几乎完全被排除在选择低级法官的过程之外，对高级法官的选择只有有限的发言权。在本文中，我认为当前政权对让部长参与个人选拔决定的合理理由重视得太少，包括部长投入的范围以增强司法独立性、提供司法多样性的政治领导以及使司法更有效履行大法官对整个司法系统的系统性责任。