ABSTRACT This paper discusses legal sex in the context of transgender jurisprudence, reviewing arguments for individual agency, elective categories and ideas concerning or ‘self-sovereignty’. It is argued that legal sex has no explicit foundation in case law or statute, and that it was effectively brought into being by the decision in Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1971] P 83. In Corbett the judge could simply have ruled that the birth certificate was determinative unless refuted by medical testimony (ie a clear mistake on its face) – instead he embarked on ontological investigation of sexual identity. That decision, paradoxically, denied that there was a category of legal sex ‘at large’, and argued that it was primarily the law of marriage that reflected sex. In other legal domains, gender identity or psychological sex could be recognized. However Corbett was treated as setting out criteria for legal sex, this understood as grounded in bodily ontology or ‘sexed being’. Reviewing arguments for self-determination, self-classification or self-ownership in relation to sexual identity, the paper concludes that there is no way for law to capture the lived ontology of sexual identity or gender. It was Corbett that gave the impetus for this approach, and even now that Corbett has been rejected, various attempts were being made to create a fit between the ontological or experiential category and legal sex. This is in principle impossible, given the diversity of identity narratives that exists in society. Legal sex, if it is required at all, needs to be understood in non-essentialist terms.

中文翻译：

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合法性，自我分类和性别自决

摘要本文讨论了跨性别法学背景下的法律性行为，回顾了有关个人代理机构的论点，选举类别和有关“自主权”的观点。有人认为，合法性在判例法或判例中没有明确的基础，而Corbett诉Corbett案（否则，Ashley）[1971] P 83中的判决有效地将其纳入了法律范围。在Corbett中，法官可以简单地裁定：除非有医学证词驳斥（即表面上明显的错误），否则出生证明是决定性的–相反，他着手进行性认同的本体研究。矛盾的是，该决定否认存在“广泛的”合法性，并认为反映婚姻的主要是婚姻法。在其他法律领域，可以识别性别认同或心理性别。然而，Corbett被视为制定合法性行为的标准，这被理解为基于身体本体论或“性存在”。回顾与性认同有关的自决，自分类或自有所有权的论点，论文得出结论，法律没有办法捕获存在的性认同或性别的本体论。正是Corbett推动了这种方法的发展，即使是现在，Corbett被拒绝了，人们仍在进行各种尝试，以在本体论或体验范畴与合法性之间建立一个契合点。鉴于社会中身份认同叙事的多样性，从原则上讲这是不可能的。如果根本需要合法性，则需要以非本质主义的术语来理解。这被理解为基于身体本体或“性存在”。回顾与性认同有关的自决，自分类或自有所有权的论点，论文得出结论，法律没有办法捕获存在的性认同或性别的本体论。正是Corbett推动了这种方法的发展，即使是现在，Corbett被拒绝了，人们仍在进行各种尝试，以在本体论或体验范畴与合法性之间建立一个契合点。鉴于社会中身份认同叙事的多样性，从原则上讲这是不可能的。如果根本需要合法性，则需要以非本质主义的术语来理解。这被理解为基于身体本体或“性存在”。回顾与性认同有关的自决，自分类或自有所有权的论点，论文得出结论，法律没有办法捕获存在的性认同或性别的本体论。正是Corbett推动了这种方法的发展，即使是现在，Corbett被拒绝了，人们仍在进行各种尝试，以在本体论或体验范畴与合法性之间建立一个契合点。鉴于社会中身份认同叙事的多样性，从原则上讲这是不可能的。如果根本需要合法性，则需要以非本质主义的术语来理解。本文得出的结论是，法律没有办法捕获存在的性认同或性别的本体论。正是Corbett推动了这种方法的发展，即使是现在，Corbett被拒绝了，人们仍在进行各种尝试来使本体论或体验范畴与合法性相适应。鉴于社会中身份认同叙事的多样性，从原则上讲这是不可能的。如果根本需要合法性，则需要以非本质主义的术语来理解。本文得出的结论是，法律没有办法捕获存在的性认同或性别的本体论。正是Corbett推动了这种方法的发展，即使是现在，Corbett被拒绝了，人们仍在进行各种尝试，以在本体论或体验范畴与合法性之间建立一个契合点。鉴于社会中身份认同叙事的多样性，从原则上讲这是不可能的。如果根本需要合法性，则需要以非本质主义的术语来理解。考虑到社会上存在的身份叙事的多样性。如果根本需要合法性，则需要以非本质主义的术语来理解。考虑到社会上存在的身份叙事的多样性。如果根本需要合法性，则需要以非本质主义的术语来理解。