Abstract

The topic of exemplarity has attracted considerable interest in philosophy, legal theory, literary studies and art recently. There is broad consensus that exemplary cases mediate between singular instances and general concepts or norms. The aim of this article is to provide an additional perspective on the logic of exemplarity. First, inspired by Jacques Derrida’s discussion of exemplarity, I shall argue that there is a kind of différance between (singular) examples and (general) exemplars. What an example exemplifies, the exemplarity of the example, eludes any fixed identity and follows a logic of supplement. Second, I shall present the so-called logic of exemplarity. The received paraconsistent view has it that the exemplar of X is an X and, at the same time, is not an X. Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of the standard metre, I would like to present an alternative paracomplete view whereby we can say of an exemplar of X neither that it is an X nor that it is not an X.

摘要

近来，典范话题在哲学、法律理论、文学研究和艺术领域引起了相当大的兴趣。人们普遍认为，典型案例在单一实例和一般概念或规范之间起到了中介作用。本文的目的是为示例性逻辑提供一个额外的视角。首先，受雅克·德里达（Jacques Derrida）关于示例性讨论的启发，我将论证（单一）示例和（一般）示例之间存在一种差异。一个例子所体现的，例子的示范性，避开了任何固定的身份，遵循了补充的逻辑。其次，我将提出所谓的范例逻辑。收到的超一致有观点认为 X 的样例是一个 X，同时又不是一个 X。受路德维希·维特根斯坦 (Ludwig Wittgenstein) 对标准米的讨论的启发，我想提出一个替代的准完全观点，据此我们可以说X 既不是 X 也不是 X。