ABSTRACT In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that s 1 Defamation Act 2013 was intended to “raise the bar” for defamation claims above the standard previously demanded at common law. However, despite finding that this was Parliament’s intention in enacting s 1, the Court held that this intention had not been successfully implemented by the wording of the Act. The notion that libel is a tort that is actionable per se is one that has a lengthy heritage at common law. However, an examination of case law between 2005 and 2013 reveals that libel had ceased to be actionable per se long before the new s 1 appeared on the statute books. The Court of Appeal thus based its ruling on a misunderstanding of the pre-Act common law position, resulting in a failure to interpret the Act in a manner consistent with the Parliamentary intention that the Court identified, thereby frustrating that very intention.

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为什么那么认真？Lachaux和《 2013年诽谤法》第1节中的“严重伤害”阈值

摘要在Lachaux诉Independent Print Ltd一案中，上诉法院裁定，《 2013年诽谤法》第1条旨在“提高标准”，以诽谤罪的索偿要求高于普通法先前规定的标准。但是，尽管发现这是国会颁布第1条的意图，法院仍认为该意图并未通过该法案的措词得到成功实施。诽谤本身是可以起诉的侵权行为这一观念在习惯法上具有悠久的传统。然而，对2005年至2013年间判例法的研究表明，诽谤本身已不再具有可诉性，早在新的第1条出现在成文法典之前。因此，上诉法院的裁决是基于对《行为法》前普通法立场的误解，