ABSTRACT Two recent decisions on applications for publication restrictions on judgments and judicial proceedings have reaffirmed the ‘ultimate balancing test’ between privacy and freedom of expression (Re S per Lord Steyn). Under that test, neither right has ‘as such’ precedence over the other. The reasoning in these decisions, particularly the emphasis on open justice, suggests the courts are treating freedom of expression as presumptively superior to privacy. This note explores the courts’ approach to the ultimate balancing test in publication restriction applications, and distinguishes between cases involving an original substantive claim based on privacy, and cases not involving such a claim. It argues this contextual distinction is critical to understanding when the freedom of expression right, though of equal value in law to the privacy right, should be treated as presumptively superior on the facts of the case, and why the courts should be explicit about this when applying the ultimate balancing test.

中文翻译：

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判决和司法程序的出版限制：权利的推定对等问题

摘要最近两项有关申请限制判决和司法程序的决定均重申了隐私与言论自由之间的“最终平衡测试”（Re S per Lord Steyn）。在该测试中，任何一项权利都没有“同样”的优先权。这些判决的理由，特别是对公开司法的强调，表明法院将言论自由推定为优于隐私。本说明探讨了法院在发布限制申请中进行最终平衡测试的方法，并区分了涉及基于隐私的原始实质性主张的案件和不涉及此类主张的案件。它认为，这种语境上的区别对于理解何时表达自由权利至关重要，