According to the agency theory, a positive relationship between company performance and good corporate governance should exist. A broader study of the author of this paper examines a sample of German stock-listed companies whereas Germany can be seen as one of the most highly regulated countries concerning corporate governance. The overall purpose of the author’s study is to analyze the effect of supervisory board characteristics and procedures on firm performance. Several corporate governance variables such as number of committees, board independency, supervisory board compensation, personal risk liability, etc. are examined regarding their effects on firm performance in terms of firm growth and profitability. Two different approaches were selected: (1) a quantitative data analysis, based on financial figures and corporate governance variables, and (2) a survey of supervisory board members out of this sample. The total sample consists of 128 German stock-listed companies. The financial data are obtained from the financial databases providers ThomsonOne and Morningstar. The corporate governance data are also collected from annual reports and from corporate governance compliance statements. According to the German Corporate Governance Codex (DCGK) each stock-listed company has to explain their compliance with the DCGK rules. Thus, the DCGK represents a benchmark of good corporate governance and allows collecting objective and comparable quantitative data to estimate the corporate governance level. The main data analysis methods are bivariate analysis and tests for statistical differences (t-test), the latter in particular to find differences between groups clustered by their 5-years total shareholder return (TSR) growth resulting in a TSR top-30 group and TSR bottom-30 group. While the fulfilment of good corporate governance standards over all shows no significant effect on firm performance, this paper focusses on the findings that risk aversion in the board room is increasing as a result of governance regulations and that growth outperformers have a lower degree of risk aversion. It is concluded that an own-risk deductible in the DO Supervisory Board; Principal–Agent Theory; Risk Aversion; Firm Performance; DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.10.16191

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董事会会议室的风险规避。德国股票上市公司的公司治理分析方法

根据代理理论，公司绩效与良好公司治理之间应存在正向关系。本文作者的更广泛研究考察了德国股票上市公司的样本，而德国可被视为公司治理方面监管最严格的国家之一。作者研究的总体目的是分析监事会特征和程序对公司绩效的影响。考察了几个公司治理变量，例如委员会数量，董事会独立性，监事会薪酬，个人风险责任等，以了解它们对公司成长和盈利能力的影响。选择了两种不同的方法：（1）基于财务数据和公司治理变量的定量数据分析，（2）从该样本中对监事会成员进行调查。样本总数包括128家德国股票上市公司。财务数据可从财务数据库提供商ThomsonOne和Morningstar获得。公司治理数据还从年度报告和公司治理合规声明中收集。根据德国公司治理法典（DCGK），每个股票上市公司都必须解释其对DCGK规则的遵守情况。因此，DCGK代表了良好公司治理的基准，并允许收集客观和可比较的定量数据以估计公司治理水平。主要的数据分析方法是双变量分析和统计差异检验（t检验），后者尤其是要找到按五年股东总回报（TSR）增长分组的集团之间的差异，从而得出TSR前30名的集团和TSR前30名的集团。尽管总体而言，良好的公司治理标准的实现对公司绩效没有显着影响，但本文着重于以下发现：由于治理法规，董事会内部的风险规避正在增加，而表现出色的风险规避程度较低。结论是DO监督委员会的自负额免赔额；委托-代理理论；风险规避；公司业绩；DOI：http：//dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.10.16191 尽管总体而言，良好的公司治理标准的实现对公司绩效没有显着影响，但本文着重于以下发现：由于治理法规，董事会内部的风险规避正在增加，而表现出色的风险规避程度较低。结论是DO监督委员会的自负额免赔额；委托-代理理论；风险规避；公司业绩；DOI：http：//dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.10.16191 尽管总体而言，良好的公司治理标准的实现对公司绩效没有显着影响，但本文着重于以下发现：由于治理法规，董事会内部的风险规避正在增加，而表现出色的风险规避程度较低。结论是DO监督委员会的自负额免赔额；委托-代理理论；风险规避；公司业绩；DOI：http：//dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.10.16191