ABSTRACT In this paper, I re-interpret Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition using the theoretical framework of J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, in particular by treating recognition, change and adjudication primarily in terms of acts, not rules. This re-interpretation elucidates why the phenomenon Hart called the ‘rule of recognition’ differs in kind from the rules of change and of adjudication, as it is not a fixed, pre-defined rule, as the latter are, but rather a paradigm-based judicial practice. The function of that practice is to recognise authoritatively both the sources and the content of individual legal rules. The proposed re-interpretation sheds a new light on the criterial nature of the rule of recognition, and elucidates why legal philosophers debate whether the rule of recognition is duty-imposing or power-conferring, as well as whether it is redundant to the rule of change or not.

中文翻译：

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言语行为理论与识别规则

摘要 在本文中，我使用 JL Austin 的言语行为理论的理论框架重新解释了 Hart 的识别规则概念，特别是通过主要从行为而非规则的角度来处理识别、改变和裁决。这种重新解释阐明了为什么哈特称为“承认规则”的现象在种类上不同于变更和裁决规则，因为它不是固定的、预先定义的规则，后者是，而是一种范式——基于司法实践。该实践的功能是权威地承认个别法律规则的来源和内容。提议的重新解释为承认规则的标准性质提供了新的启示，并阐明了为什么法学家争论承认规则是强制执行还是授予权力，